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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LE ROY SHELBY and ADAN
THORNOCK,
Re:)pondents a·nd Plai·nt·iffs,

vs.
NICK CHOeRNOS,
Defendant and AppBllant.
STATE~fENT

OF CASE

For convenience of the Court and counsel, the parties hereto will be ref erred to as they were in the lower
court, wherein appellant was the defendant and respondents- were plaintiffs.
The defendant, in the opening paragraph of his
brief states the question involved in this appeal as being,
''What rights, if any, has the owner of grazing
lands to protect the same against wilful and corttinuous trespassing of livestock~''
The answer to the question propounded is that an
owner of grazing land has three remedies against trespassing livestock, as follows :
1. A suit for injunction against the owner of the
trespassing livestock to restrain the continued trespass.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~.

An action for damages caused. by the trespass.

3. The rig-ht to remove the trespassing animals from

his land.
This appeal involves only the third remedy, namely,
the rig-ht of the o\vner to remove the trespassing animals, as the action---below- did not involv-e either of the
first two -remedies. According-ly, the only issue - involved in this appeal is wh-ether the defendant acted
w·ithin the limitations prescribed by law in his removal
of plaintiff's lives to~ from his property. The lower
court held that the manner in which defendant removed
plaintiffs' livestock from his property was unlawful,
with resulting damages to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the
only question involved is whether there was evidence
before the lo\ver court- to support the finding complained
of.

'

STA.'rE~IENT

OF FACTS

. Defendant?s statement of facts in this case does
not adequately reflect . the .evidence which was before
the lower court, and for that reasOll, we deem. it advisable to review briefly the evidence .
.On June 12,. 1946, plaintiffs purchased thirty-six
head of steers and at that time placed them on plaintiff
Shelby's property, ( \Vhich .constitutes approxirila tely one
section ofjaud -located) in Rich County," Utah.· (The de~endant o\vned or had control of a vast amount of land,
or approximately sixteen thousand ac-res, that substantially enclosed the land of the plaintiff.) That, ou the
29th day of September, 1946, the plaintiff LeRoy 8helby
had placed his stock oil a portion of his lauds completely
2
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bounded by a feuee on the 'vest and north, together
"~ith almost all of the east side of his property, ( Tr. 52)
~ ·Q

.A.nd your land on the east "\Yas open between
yourself and

~lr.

Chournos ~ ''

. 1. X o sir, it's mostly fenced with the exception
of just a slig·ht bit at the v.ery corner there.

Q On the 19th of August.
A Yes sir, that "\Yas the day I got the fence on
the \vest finished. ' '
although the southern portion of plaintiff Shelby's property was open. (Tr. 45, Plaintiffs' Exhibit C)
As late as 10:00 o'clock in the mon1ing on that date,
all of the cattle were on Shelby's property. (Tr. 56)
At approximately 3 :00 or 4:00, Shelby and his wife,
on horseback, \vent up to round up the thirty-six head
of the steers ( Tr. 54). At that time they were only able
to find 19 head, but they were located on Shelby's
property along his west fence. (Tr. 54) Shelby and his
wife proceeded to drive the cattle across his property
to the north and out a gate on his nothern boundary and
down what had been used as a roadway when he· was
stopped by Marriner Brown (Tr. 19), while the seventeen head of cattle proceeded on down the road and
around a bend in the hill. During the period that plaintiff and his wife conversed with 1'1r. Brown, Mr. Chournos appeared, riding on horseback, from a distance
away, a fact which was admitted by the defendant (Tr.
82-84). Upon finishing the conversation, plaintiff Shelby and his wife proceeded down to the Monte Cristo
road, which wa.s to the north of them, a.nd were .unable ·
to see their cattle, although they were advised by one
Longhurst that he had seen ~Ir. Chournos, the defendS
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ant, driving the seventeen head of cattle while on horseback and with the aid of a dog. At that time, the cattle
were on a run. (Tr. 21)

"Q Now you say he \vas driving cattle. Just what
what do you mean, sir'
A Well, he 'vas having a dog bite the cattle. They
\Vere on the run and a fey{ of the cattle had their
tongues out and seemed to be pretty well out of
breath.''
Approximately one hour later, these cattle were seen
returning in the general direction of the Shelby property at a distance between four and six miles away
from the Shelby property. (Tr. 26-28, Tr. 68-70)
This running occurred between the hours of onehalf hour before sunset (Tr. 19) and one-half hour after
sunset (Tr. 27). It might be pointed out at this time
that both plaintiffs' witness and defendant's witness
stated that one-half hour after sunset, they were returning towards the Shelby property, which would indicate that they must logically have come from a point
further from the point from the Shelby property than
that where they we~e seen.
The evidence as to the nineteen head of cattle which
plaintiff Shelby did not find on that afternoon of September 29th indicates that he tracked a single footed
horse, which was the horse that Mr. Chournos admitted
riding, for a distance of four and one-half to five miles
east of the Shelby property (Tr. 80), and the evidence
further indiootes (Tr. 61-63) that they were likewise
driven on a run.
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Evidene<.'} 8hO\\·ed that eattle should not be driven
at a rate to exceed t\YO and one-half miles per hour,
and that 8hould they be driven all day at that rate,
that tht\Y mig-ht lose up to four per cent of their gross
'veigbt. (Tr. 28-44).
Defenda11t Chouruos maintains that his only purpose in driYing the rattle at all \Yas to remove them from
his premises, yet he drove the seventeen head of steers
(Tr. 77- 86) a distance of some three and one-half miles
a\vay from the premises owned by the plaintiff, although
he admitted that he knew that there was every likeihood that the milk cow would return or attempt to return to the Shelby property, and that steers are inclined
to follow a leader and therefore some
would follow the
\
milk C0"\"\ A few did and in so doing· duplicated in reverse
the course they had taken over the defendants' property.
This would seem to be a peculiar method of removing
cattle from one's premises.
7

•

Defendant stated that his only reason for driving
the other nineteen head of steers was a similar desire
to rid his premises of these particular animals, although
the evidence shows that he drove them between four
and four and one-half miles east of the Shelby property,
although his east line was approximately one-half mile
east of the Shelby property, so that the facts sho\v
that the defendant drove the cattle some three and onehalf or four miles east and beyond the defendant's east-ern property line. As a result of defendant's driving of
these cattle, they became lost to the plaintiff and wer·3
found in rocky, mountainous country without adequate
forage or water as long as three \veeks after defendant
drove them. (rrr. 3-7, Tr. 35-50). When they were
5
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found, they bad lost au average \veight of ninety pounds.
(Tr. 3-7, Tr. 45-50, Tr. 6{}-62). The cattle we-re thereafter delivered to Sage, Wyoming, to market, "There
they sold at an average price of 16lj2 cents per pound,
and -crediting this value per pound to the weight lost,
it was found that the plaintiffs had been damaged in
the sum of Five Hundred Thirty-Four and 60/100
( $534.60) Dollar~.
ARGUl\iENT
It will be observed that the only objection appellaut
voices is that the facts do not justify the verdict.
This case \vas tried to the court without a jury,
and the rule in such eases is stated in 5 C. J. S., Appeal
and Error, Sec. 1656 ACQ, at Page 687.
"When facts are involved the appellate court
is extremely reluctant to disagree with the trial
court and the latter's findings are at all times
given gTeat weight and deference, particularly
\vhere the tr•iai judge saw and heard 'vitb \Yitnesses giving oral testimony.
Ordinarily the findings will uot be disturbed if
they are not clearly, plainly, palpably or manifestly wrong or erroneous. * * * * If examination
discloses * * * * the findings are not wholly or
totally wi tbout support in the evidence * * * *
nor unreasonable, unsustainable on any reasonable theory or hypothesis * * * * the appellate
court \viii affirm.''
With this rule in mind, let us examine defendant 'R
several points demonstrating· that there is no reversible
error in the record of this case.
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. Did the trial eourt

l~rr

iu

it~

] 1 indiug No. 1 ~?

'fhe evideuee eleurly 8hO\r8 on September 29th plaintiffs \Yel't the ovv'ner of thirty-six head of steers (see
Exhibit C), and the evidence sho\rs that they were on
property enelo8Pd by the plaintiff LeRoy Shelby. (Tr.
52).
1

~.

Did the trial eourt err in

it~

E,iuding No. 2 ~~

The evidence as stated before (Tr. 52) indicates
that on or about 10 :00 o'clock in the morning on September 29th, all of the steers belonging· to the plaintiffs ·w·ere on the plaintiff Shelby's property.
3. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 4 ~
Counsel professes ignorance of the word ''malici~
ously". The word is defined by Webster as, "Charaeterized by or involving malice; having or done \vith or
mischievous intentions or motives".
The facts at bar indicate that defendant drove
seventeen head of cattle a space of four to six miles in
an hour in a direction directly away from the owner's
premises. Defendant expressed his intent only to rid
his premises of th animals, but the facts show he could
have called or returned the cattle to the owners in a
matter of minutes, and could have driven them off his
premises in a short distance, but instead, he drove them
over his land and in a direction opposite to the land
of the plaintiff (Tr. 77 and 86) for an admitted three
and one-half miles, well knowing that some would return to the Shelby property because a milk cow was
among· them. (Tr. 86-88).
'j
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~,he

facts as to the rest of the cattle iudicate that
defendant's horse was with them at a distance of five
miles to the east of the Shelby property. ( Tr. 47).
Defendant maintains he only wanted to drive them
off his property, but the evidence shows that his east
ine is about one-half mile east of the Shelby property
line, as is admitted by counsel at (Tr. 80). This would
indicate he drove the cattle some four and one-half
miles past his east line.
Tl].ere is ample evidence that they were drive11
a rapid pace. (Tr. 61-63).

'~ 1

The evidence further shows all the cattle \Vere left
in a rocky area \vhere there \Va.s insufficient feed and
/or \Vater. (Tr. 47, Tr. 57-63).

±. Did the trial court err in its :B..,inding· No. 3 t
r~ehe

defendant objects to that portion of the FindIng as follows :
''Defendant came upon the remaining seventeen head of steers upon a public road near a
water hole kno\Vll ~s l\Iillie Spring.''
a11d also:

'' * * and then and there wilfully and maliciously
drove said seventeen head of steers from said
water hole and for a distance of four to six
miles and sea ttered the same among the breaks
and brush and in a locality \Vhere there \vas then
and there insufficient feed and water for their
proper suhsiS'tence. ''
The facts as to the Finding- of fact indicate that
the first contention is erroneous in that the court found:
8
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'· Defeudaut eHllll~ npou the rPillaiuiug· ~t~veu teeu
head of s tel\rs at or upar a 'Yater hole knowu
as :Jiillie Spring.''

With reference to defendant's other objection to
Finding No. 5, it is believed that this is fully discussed
in the facts set out relative to Finding No. 4.

5. Did the trial eourt err in

it~

Finding No. 61

Defendant '8 net~ relati \·e to tl~e niueteen head
ltaYe already been di8cussed iu Paragraph 3 above.
However, as to the condition of all of the cattle,
:::;ee Tr. 10.
'• They looked pretty hard. They had a lot of
roug-h treatment. They didn't look like the sam8
cattle at all.''
Further the record is filled with evidence that the
cattle suffered an average loss of ninety pounds. (Tr.
3-11, Tr. 64-6, Tr. 45-63).

6. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 7 ~
The evidence is that there was no reason for the
cattle to trespass on or stray from the Shelby property,
for the reason that Shelby had (Tr. 50) gone to great
lengths to improve the grass and forage on his property
by planting brome grass and crested wheat g;rass.
Further, there was water for said cattle on leased
ground of plaintiff immediately south of his main property. (See Exhibit "B", Plaintiff's land marked in
red).
7. Did the trial court err in its Finding No. 8 ~
The evidence shows without question that the cattle
were sold on October 29th for 16 1/2 cents per pound,
9
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and that but for the acts of the defendant, the cattl<~
would have been ninety pounds heavier on that date.
No other evidence was needed.
8. Did the trial court err in its l?iuding No. 9 and
No.

10~

As appellant admits, there is ample evidence to fi11tl
that the steers shrunk about ninety pounds apiece bet\veen September 29th and October 29th, ''Then the~
vvere sold. Appellant raises a question as to ho\v much
of the damage ·was caused by the running and ho\v
much by the lack of food and \Vater. As will be seen
by the law hereinafter cited, these questions raise problems that are immaterial and irrelevant. The fact is
that due to the defendant's wrongful acts, these cattle
lost weig·ht. How much of this loss is attributable to
one wrongful act and how much to another is not a
question of any merit.. The only question is whether
defendant's acts resulted in the loss, and the answer
to that is an unqualified ' 'yes' '.
9. Defendant makes a contention of error in entering Conclusion of Law No. 1 and in entering Judgement in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
and in assessing the damag·es in the sum of Five Hundred Thirty-Four aud 60/100 ($534.60) Dollars.

The ref ore let us 'examine the la ,,~ rela tiYe to the
points now raised.
LAW
1. There seems to be a great deal of contention

made by the defendant as to that part of Findings No.
1 and No. 2 that indicate that the cattle had been en-

10
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closed for a ~nb~tautial period of tin1e and \Vere released in au unfenced enclosure only the day that
they \rere driven.
There is a great deal of conflict in the evidence
relative to this, and some eYidence to the effect that
they had been out for a considerable period.

It is submitted, lunreYer, that these findings are
irnmnterial and irrele\'·aut to the cause of action before
the Court, and \Vere put in the eomplaiut and the findings probably by reason of counsel for plaintiffs Inexperience.
The sole question in this matter· is whether or :not
the defendant came upon steers owned by the plaintiffs
on September 29, 1946, and wilfully and maliciously
and to become lost.
As regards to this question, whether they had
been enclosed or in an enclosure for a period prior to
the time of the acts complained of is irrelevant and not
material to this case and further can have no injuriouH
effect on the defendant's rights.
The law on this subject is found at 5 C. J. S;, Sec-.
tiun 1787, page 1192.
''The mere taking of unnecessary and superfluous findings or the presence of error in finding·s on immaterial, irreleva1~t, or purely collateral
issues is harmless and uon-re,~ersible error if
'
the judgement iH otherwise sufficiently supported.''
''A judgement supported by proper finding~ i.~
uot vitiated- by finding-s on immaterial 1)oints or
issue, for example, on issues outside the plead11
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iuo·s
or unsurJported
by~ evidence ' or \\'here \\Thatb
~
ever the findings on the issue it affords appellant no cause of action or grounds of defense,
but is without legal consequence; such findings
may be treated as surplusag·e and discredited not
only in that action, but als-o in subsequent litigation.''
li'urther from 5 C. fl. S., fJecf:ion 1677, Page 810 aud 811,
"The rule as to those errors ·which are in principle collateral and without influence on the final
result is that the record must not only establish the error but the party complaining with prejudice thereby; there must be an affirmatiYe
showing that it was not unlikely that the error
effected the result.''
"The doctrine of harmless error is favored and
will be applied whenever it is reasonable and
safe to do so.''
As has already been submitted, the errors, that defendant now complains of, are collateral and do not influence the final result, or verdict, and further, it is to
he noted that at no place in the brief of the defendant
is there any affirmative showing that these errors, jf
errors they be, adversely affected his rights.
It is further submitted that this case \Vas tried before a judge who had been trained in the profession of
law, and as a consequence, would give little o1· no heed
to any irrelevant matter that might enter into the record, and that the defendant is not and was not prejudiced by these findings.
The above law and argument might also be applied
to defendant's seventh contention of error, namely, his
objections to Findings No. 8.

12
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:2. l'he ht\\~ relati\'l\ to the principal i~sue presented
by thi:::; ca8e seems to be uniform, although all the cases
\rhich eouu~el has been able to find are relatively old
cases. .J..\t 3 ('~. J. S., 4-Lnintals, Section 189, it is found:

" ..\ laiH.lO\\·ner ha~ a right to drive trespassing
animals from his lautl \Yhether it is or is not en·clo~ed, \vithout being liable for any injuries to
~uch animals, if he u~e~ only ~uch ·nteans and jo1·ce
a8 are cuHtnu:usura.te tvith a:nd ._..,·trictly lim~ited by
fht: exi~:ti·ng uecesst:ty. Further, the r'ight to drive ·
off exists ollly to the extent necessary to prevent
further injury to the la·udo~on.er, a·nd must be exercised Leith reaso~nable care to prevent unnecessary injuries to the trespassing animals.''
(Italics added)

Again, at ~ 4-lntericau Jurisprudeuce, ..._4ni1nals, Sect-ion 126, it is found :
''A landowner has a right to exclude animals
from his pre-mises but in doing so, he must exercises that degree of care to prevent injury
that would ordinarily be observed by a pruduent
person, and if harm results to them from failure
to exercise such caution, he is liable for damages
to the owner. He is likewise liable if he employs

towards them any unnecessary violence. Morover, as this right of the landowner to drive off
the animals is based purely on the principle of
preven.tation-, -it ceases as soon as they have
crossed the litre 1narkin.g the limits of his territory. Thus, if a man drives cattle of another

upun a highway in a direction to him known to
be opposite to the owner's residence, and they
are lost in consequence, he is liable for ronversion, althoug·h he did not intend it.''
(Italics added)

13
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In Scott vs. (}ates, (North Carolina) 95 S. E. 551,
the defendant shot certain bird dogs belonging to plaintiff, claiming· that they were chasing· a flock of turkey~
and it was necessary to shoot in order to prevent the turkeys from destruction. The Court holding· for the plaintiff, state the presence of the dogs on the premises of
defendant gave him the right to drive them away but
not to injure them unnecessarily, although they 'vere
trespassing. The Court further stated that it was erroneous to charge a jury that the burden was on th~
plaintiff to satisfy the jury that the shooting· 'vas unlawful and wrongful, and held at the same time, that the
burden should be on the defend~nt to prove a legal excuse
for his acts to the satisfaction of the jury. In other
words it is interpreted by the Supreme Court of N ortb
Carolina that the acts are in the nature of an a firmative defense \\Thich defendant must prove and justify,
rather than an action for the plaintiff to prove.
The reason is obvious that this must be so because
such facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of only
the defendant. Yet in the ease at bar, defendant's only
evidence is that he drove the cattle in the ''ordinary
manner" and he refused to explain what "ordinary
manner'' meant.
In the case of Richa-r-ds vs. Sauder son, (Colorado),
89 Pac. 759, the defendant drove plaintiff's cattle, and
the Court held to the effect that defendant would not
be liable for damages in driving plaintiff's cattle off
defendant's land if he did so without any unnecessary
injury to the cattle, and held that in an action to recover actual damages for wrongful driving of plain-

14
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tiff's eattle, it is imn1at~rial \\'hether or uot before driv--

ing the c.attle, the defendant in good faith took legal
advice and \vas governed thereby in what he did.
In Thornpson vs. Sta.te, 16 . Alabama 106, 42 America·n Reports 101, the defendant was charged with killing hogs of the plaintiff \vhile the hogs were in the act
of eating, or destroying a gro\\ring crop of corn on the
premise8 of the defendant. The Court held,
'~ EYery

person has a la\\rful right to defend hi~
personal property, not for the purpose of redressing an injury already perpetrated, but purely upon the principle of preventa.tion in the present and for the future. Yet this right, valuable
and important as it is, must he commensurate
with and strictly limited to the existing necessity.''
The Court found for the plaintiff and ordered that it
did not make any difference how the hogs got on the
defendant's land, whether by breaking through the fence,
or by a gate that had been left open.
In the case at bar, it would seem that there is ample
proof that defendant's handling of the cattle was not
as an ordinary and prudent man would have done, but
rather, that they were handled by a man who was. very
irate, angry, and determined to inflict some injury upon the plaintiff.
Counsel apparently gets a great deal of comfort
out of a statement in Corpus ~Turis Secundum as follows:
''Ordinarily if the land owner lawfully drives
trespassing· animals - off of his premises he is
not liable because he drives them in a direction
opposite to that of their owner's premises, and
if the animals enter from the highway on remote

15
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premises the land owner may return them to the
highway on unenclosed lands and will not be liable for any injury threafter suffered by them,
expeeially where the injury is the result of the
owner's negligence in failing to care for them
after notice of their situation.''
An examination of the above statement indicates
that the only authority for such statement is the case
of Humphrey vs. Douglass, 11 Vt. 22, 34 A1nerican Decisions 668. For a proper examination of the facts ~n
this case, it must be understood that this case was .'-t
rehearing of the ease of Humphrey vs. Douglass, 10 Vt.
71, 33 American Decisions 177. The facts in this cas(~
indicate that two horses broke through an adjoining fence
onto the property of the defendant, and that upon diseovering them, he took them out to the road and turned
them loose. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that_ he turned them in an opposite direction to
plaintiff's land. It would seem, therefore, that the
decision quoted does not sustain the contention of the
author of the Corpus Juris Secundum article.
It is further interesting to note that the case u~ed
as authority for the above decisions is that of Richardso~z
vs. Carr, 25 American Decisions 56, 1 Ha.rrington 142
(Delaw~are) wherein the Court says:
'''If a cow be found trespassing on anther's prcerty, the owner of the property may impound
her or sue for damages or drive her out; but i!1
driving her out, he must use only necessary violence or he becomes himself a trespasser and liable in damages to the owner of the cow. If the
defendant in this ease beat the plaintiff's cow
and mangled her 'vith dogs, as he is charged, he
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is a trespabtit\r, though the CO\\' was in his cornfield; and the pla.intiff ought to have damages
to the value of the CO\\' if her death was occasioned
by his act. ''
It would seem that the only actual case that goes to
the direction in 'vhich cattle or stock may be driven
"·hen being removed from one's premises is the case of
Tob-in cs. Deal, (Wi~co·usi-n) 18 "f-l. ll'". 634, ''"'herein it was
held that if a man drives the cattle of another upon a
bigh,vay in a direction known to him to be opposite to
the owner's residence, and they are lost in consequence,
he is liable for conversion, although hedid not intend it.
It would
authority for
bad the right
direction that

seem, therefore, that there is no case
counsel's contention that the defendant
to drive the oattle in any way or in any
he chose. ·

It . would seem, therefore, that upon examination
of all the law available, the acts of driving animals off
one's property must be done under the guidance of two
requisites imposed- by law, (1) the driver must only
use such means and force as are necessary to drive the
animals off his property, and that he is liable in damages for any· unnecessary violence occasioned by such
act, and(2) that the act of driving must be based purely
upon the principle of prevention of present injury to
his property.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs do not admit that there is any trespass in this case, but submit the evidence as to the seventeen head of cattle indicates that they were driven dowu
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'vhat had been desig~1ated as a road and used for the
purpose of going to and from water, and that it wa~
recog11ized as a road.
It is further submitted that the remaining nineteen head were taken by the defendant from the land
of the plaintiff, and that his acts relative to both band~
of cattle were entirely repehensible and without right.
It is submitted, however, that even if it be found
that the cattle were trespassing upon land of the defendant, his acts did not adhere to the law hereinbefore
set forth.
Defendant endeavors to break his 'vrongful acts
into two parts as regards damages and he seems to hold
that even if he be found quilty of wrongfully driving
plaintiffs' cattle, he is only liable for the loss engendered
as a result of the running and is not liable for the immediate consequences of this act.
This would seem to be directly contrary to the la ".
of the Tobin case supra and the other authorities cited.
It is also inconceivable as a matter of sheer logic that
it can be maintained that a man may be held responsible
for the actual doing of a deed but not responsible for
the direct result of the deed. Surely the appellant
would not contend that had he run the cattle over a cliff,
he would be responsible only for the damages sustained
to the animals while they were running to the brink of
the cliff, and the appellant would be free of the damages sustained to the cattle as a result of their fall.
It would seem, threfore, relatively obvious that th0
appellant did not drive the cattle (1) off his premise3
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in the manner that a rua~onable aud prudent man woulu
do, (2) \Yith an effort to minimize his damages, but that
in fact the appellant \Yas motiYated solely with a desire
to inflict damages and harm upon the plaintiffs, and
as a direct and proximate result of his wrongful acts,
these cattle \vere damaged, as the Court found, in an
average loss of \Yeight of ninety _pounds per animal.
It is ~ubmitted that the judgement of the District
Court i.s supported not only by ample competent evidence, but by the la,Y, and it is requested that this appeal
be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
c:Iyde Patterson

Attorney

fo~r

Respondents

aJt-d Plaintiffs

..
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